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One response to the Great Recession of 2008–2009 in several econ-
omies of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) was increased reliance on short-time compensation (STC) and 
other work-sharing arrangements that temporarily reduce weekly hours 
to ease labor market dislocations and to avoid the personal and eco-
nomic costs of elevated levels of long-term unemployment. Short-time 
compensation has been credited with helping to stabilize employment in 
the face of sharp reductions in real gross domestic product (GDP). The 
research conducted by Burda and Hunt (2011) and Boeri and Bruecker 
(2011) concludes that the STC program in Germany (Kurzarbeit) was a 
major contributor in stabilizing German employment in 2009 and 2010.
As labor markets in the United States recover from the Great Reces-
sion, it is appropriate to assess the performance of the economy during 
this period and consider ways of structuring labor market institutions 
to lessen the economic hardships of future recessions. Not only did 
U.S. product markets deteriorate, but labor markets also experienced 
sharp decreases in employment, steep increases in unemployment, and 
record high levels of long-term unemployment. Given the severity of 
labor market conditions since 2007, this chapter examines the recent 
performance of STC in states with such programs and assesses their 
impact on employment. The chapter begins with an introduction to STC 
and a description of some of the important features of the program, 
and then reviews the performance of STC in the United States for the 
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17 states that have operated programs for several years. The next sec-
tion reviews foreign experience with STC, with particular attention to 
the performance of STC programs in Canada, Germany, and Belgium. 
The following section discusses ways to increase STC usage in the 
United States. While some suggestions are obvious, others would make 
changes in the way STC plans currently function within state unem-
ployment insurance (UI) programs.
The chapter reaches three main conclusions. First, STC has the 
potential to prevent layoffs and stabilize employment in short-run cycli-
cal fl uctuations. While program usage increases sharply at the start of 
a recession, the increased utilization lasts for a comparatively short 
period. Second, the programs in the United States are small in scale and 
do not meaningfully affect labor market adjustments at the macro level. 
Third, if STC were to play a larger role during the economic recovery as 
well as a larger role in future recessions, the programs would need to be 
enlarged and the pace of adoptions expanded. In addition to presenting 
suggestions for increasing STC usage, the chapter assesses the Febru-
ary 2012 legislation: the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act 
of 2012 (PL12-96). 
AN OVERVIEW OF WORK SHARING
Short-time compensation work-sharing programs, now present in 
many economies, are intended to reduce the volume of layoffs during 
periods of slack labor demand.1 Rather than reducing hours by laying 
off (nonprejudicial separations) some workers, a wider pool of workers 
at the workplace is retained but at reduced weekly hours of work. For 
example, to reduce hours by 20 percent in a work unit that employs 
100 persons working 40-hour weeks, there would need to be 20 lay-
offs. Alternatively, all 100 in the work unit could be placed on 32-hour 
schedules. Both measures would reduce hours by 20 percent.
These employment retention programs provide partial unemploy-
ment compensation (UC) benefi ts to workers placed on shorter sched-
ules. For example, if UC benefi ts replace half of previous weekly wages, 
then someone on a 32-hour schedule would receive 80 percent of their 
full weekly wages and partial UC benefi ts equal to 10 percent of weekly 
up12lartw0ch6.indd   114 10/12/2012   12:56:10 PM
Stabilizing Employment   115
wages. Thus, part of the reduction in income caused by the reduction in 
hours is offset by partial UC benefi ts. In this simple example, partici-
pants in STC would receive take-home pay equal to 90 percent of their 
full weekly wages.2
In the United States in 2011, 21 states had STC programs that were 
generally small in scale. While 4 states introduced STC programs dur-
ing 2010 and 2011, the other 17 states have operated these programs for 
20 years or longer. A program for STC is established through legislation 
as part of a state’s UI law. Short-time compensation plans, administered 
as part of UI, are initiated when an employer fi les an application with 
the UI agency. To be eligible to participate in STC, the employer must 
be experience rated, not delinquent in paying UI taxes, and explain the 
reason(s) for needing to adjust work hours. Plans submitted to the UI 
agency are often approved within one or two weeks.
Short-time compensation plans need to conform to state require-
ments regarding a minimum percentage reduction in hours at the 
affected work unit, plan duration, the minimum and maximum reduc-
tion in hours for affected workers, and the maximum number of weeks 
STC benefi ts will be paid. Table 6A.1 in Appendix 6A displays impor-
tant state-level requirements for 17 states with long-standing STC 
programs. Plans generally last 25 or 52 weeks and maximum payable 
weeks are usually 26 or 52. For affected workers, the reduction in hours 
is bounded between a minimum (10–20 percent in all states) and a max-
imum (40–50 percent in nearly all states). Plans also must specify the 
treatment of fringe benefi ts (usually either full maintenance or reduced 
by the proportionate reduction in hours worked). When workers are 
unionized, the plan must be approved by the collective bargaining unit. 
Certain features of STC are linked to standard UI provisions. One is 
that the benefi ts paid to participants count against the experience-rated 
UI taxes paid by the employer. Since the employer initiates this reduc-
tion in hours, STC payments are experience rated in the same way as a 
layoff. When claimants start to collect STC, the payments count against 
their maximum potential payment for the benefi t year (the 12-month 
period for which current UI eligibility applies). For example, someone 
otherwise eligible for 26 weeks of benefi ts under full unemployment 
would only be eligible for 24 weeks if they collected STC one day per 
week for 10 weeks earlier in the same benefi t year. Most states make 
regular recipients serve a waiting week before collecting benefi ts. For 
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STC recipients, this requirement means they can start collecting in the 
second week of the STC claim. While regular UI recipients are required 
to search for work, this requirement is waived for STC recipients since 
they remain employed.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF STC IN THE UNITED STATES
The STC reporting system generates monthly data that can be com-
pared with regular state UI data. Initial claims, fi rst payments, weeks 
claimed, weeks compensated, exhaustions and total benefi t payments 
are routinely reported, along with equivalent initial claims and equiva-
lent weeks claimed. In the latter two series, claims are converted to 
equivalent full weeks; that is, a week claimed by fi ve persons working 
under a 20 percent reduction in weekly hours represents one equiva-
lent week claimed. Under certain assumptions, the equivalent weeks 
claimed show the number of layoffs and weeks of full unemployment 
avoided by the use of STC.
The empirical analysis focuses on STC equivalent weeks claimed 
measured as a percentage of regular UI weeks claimed in annual data 
for the past three business cycles. For 13 of 17 states, the data extend 
from 1989 to 2010; there are fewer years in four states.3 All regression 
equations use the same specifi cation: the equivalent-weeks-claimed 
percentage is explained by the total unemployment rate (TUR) in the 
state and a linear trend. The TUR is entered for both the current year 
and the previous year. Both the current TUR and the lagged TUR coef-
fi cients show how equivalent weeks claimed behave relative to regular 
weeks claimed. A positive coeffi cient for the TUR indicates that STC 
equivalent weeks increase more rapidly than regular weeks in a reces-
sion when the TUR increases.
Table 6.1 summarizes the 17 regression equations by showing the 
distribution of the signs and statistical signifi cance of the coeffi cients. 
Table 6B.1 in Appendix 6B displays the full regression results. All 17 
coeffi cients for the current TUR are positive and statistically signifi -
cant. A remarkably consistent pattern is present in all 17 states: when 
unemployment increases, STC equivalent weeks increase more rapidly 
than regular UI weeks claimed.
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The effect of the lagged TUR is also consistent. All 17 slope coeffi -
cients are negative and 13 are statistically signifi cant: equivalent weeks 
of STC decline relative to regular weeks in the second year of a reces-
sionary period. As the economy travels further through a recession, 
the volume of STC claims decreases even though unemployment may 
remain high or even increase. Comparing the absolute size of the two 
sets of coeffi cients, those for the lagged TUR are generally from half to 
fully equal to the current TUR coeffi cients. Not only is there a falloff, 
but the falloff is also large relative to the increase in the fi rst year of the 
recession.
The linear trend coeffi cients in Table 6.1 present a more mixed pic-
ture.4 For 14 of the 17 states there is an upward (positive) trend in STC 
usage with nine trends statistically signifi cant. Three states exhibit a 
negative trend, and in two of them the trend is statistically signifi cant 
(Florida and Maryland). Despite the predominance of positive trends, 
STC programs are, and remain, small in all states. Note in Table 6B.1 
of Appendix 6B that the STC equivalent-weeks percentage exceeds 1.0 
percent in just one state (Rhode Island) for the full data period; the per-
centage exceeds 0.4 in just four other states for the same period (Cali-
fornia, Kansas, Missouri, and Vermont).
The underlying data illustrate not only the unusual severity of the 
Great Recession but also its effect on the scale of STC usage. Over 
the 22 years from 1989 to 2010, the highest equivalent-weeks-claimed 
percentage occurred in 2009 for 16 of the 17 states (all but Kansas). 











Constant 1 4 4 8 17
State unemp. 
rate—TUR%
17 0 0 0 17
State TUR% 
lagged
0 0 4 13 17
Linear trend 9 5 1 2 17
SOURCE: Regression equations displayed in Table 6B.1 of Appendix 6B.
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Even though the TUR was higher in 2010 than in 2009 in most of the 
17 states, the equivalent-weeks-claimed percentage in 2010 fell below 
the 2009 percentage in all but one state (Washington).
The regression results shown in Table 6B.1 and summarized in 
Table 6.1 portray a remarkably consistent pattern. When the economy 
enters a recession, STC usage increases sharply and much more rap-
idly than regular UI claims. Usage then falls, however, even in the face 
of continued high unemployment. The interpretation of the regression 
results seems obvious. Going into a recession, employers establish STC 
plans and place workers on reduced weekly schedules. These workers, 
however, do not remain on short schedules for very long. As the reces-
sion lengthens they exit through two outfl ows. While some workers 
return to full weekly work schedules, others experience full layoffs. For 
the latter group, STC delays the onset of full unemployment. For par-
ticipating employers, STC provides more time to observe the depth and 
duration of the downturn and yields improved information upon which 
to make better informed adjustments in staffi ng.
 For fi rms that retain long-run viability, there are two important 
advantages in utilizing STC programs: 1) the increased level of worker 
retention, and 2) reduced training costs since fewer new hires are needed 
in the ensuing upturn. For workers, there are fewer layoffs early in the 
recession and a different pattern of burden sharing (wider but smaller 
per-person losses for affected workers) due to reduced layoffs. One dis-
advantage for workers who eventually do lose their jobs is that STC 
only delays the layoffs—it is not avoided. For them STC has simply 
delayed the timing of the job loss.5
Some other aspects of worker experiences with STC can be inferred 
from state reports. Because the states report both weeks claimed and 
equivalent weeks claimed, the size of the reductions in weekly sched-
ules can be ascertained. The higher the ratio of equivalent weeks to 
total weeks, the larger the reduction in work schedules; for example, 
a ratio of 0.20 suggests a reduction of one day from a fi ve-day week. 
Overall, the reductions in work schedules have generally been modest. 
For 14 states, the equivalent weeks to weeks ratio between 2000 and 
2010 averaged between 0.176 and 0.265. Ratios in this range suggest 
that reductions for STC participants usually averaged one to one-and-
one-half days per week. These ratios also indicate that the number of 
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individuals participating in STC is 3–5 times larger than suggested by 
the equivalent weeks ratios examined in the regressions. 
As with temporary layoff unemployment, participation in STC is 
generally short term. Between 2000 and 2010, the mean duration of 
STC was shorter than for regular UI benefi ts in 13 of the 14 states with 
reliable STC duration data.6 The ratio of the two averages was below 
0.80 in 10 states, and only in Rhode Island and Vermont were they 
similar in size. Moreover, exhaustion of benefi ts while on STC is rare 
because duration is short and a compensated week usually involves 
only one or two days in benefi t status. Exhaustion rates between 2000 
and 2010 were signifi cantly lower for persons receiving fi rst payments 
under STC compared to the regular UI program in 15 of the 17 states 
with STC programs. The average exhaustion rate for these 11 years was 
almost always less than 5 percent for STC recipients compared to 30 
percent or higher for regular UI program recipients.
One would expect STC recipients to have higher wages and, hence, 
higher weekly benefi ts than those on layoff and other job losers because 
a layoff typically affects less senior workers. The STC data support this 
expectation. In the 13 states where full weekly benefi ts for STC recipi-
ents can be calculated, their average STC benefi ts consistently exceeded 
average weekly benefi ts in the regular UI program. The ratio of the STC 
average to the regular program average during the 2000–2010 period 
ranged between 1.00 and 1.15 for 10 of the 13 states. Since the reported 
data do not identify the occupations of STC participants, we cannot 
compare the skill levels of participants to regular UI recipients.
Three concluding comments are appropriate as a summary of the 
empirical work in this section of the chapter. First, utilization of STC 
was very sensitive to the business cycle over the last three recessions 
for which reported data are available. Second, the utilization of STC 
was highest during the early stages of the Great Recession. Third, the 
scale of STC utilization has been consistently small in all 17 states. 
This last comment provides a logical connection to the next section 
of the chapter, which examines international experience with STC and 
provides a brief description of STC programs in three other advanced 
countries.
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COMPARISONS OF STC IN FOUR COUNTRIES
Short-time compensation work-sharing programs are present in the 
majority of advanced economies with new adoptions occurring in sev-
eral after the onset of the Great Recession. Hijzen and Venn (2011) note 
that 22 OECD economies reported either introducing new measures 
or making adjustments to existing programs in response to the most 
recent downturn. Program details vary widely across countries. Here 
we briefl y examine three foreign programs: 1) Canada, 2) Germany, 
and 3) Belgium. The choice of these countries is based on past experi-
ences of the authors and knowledge of their differing scales. While all 
three foreign programs are larger than STC in the United States, the 
Canadian program can be described as similar in size. The programs in 
Germany and Belgium have a much larger presence in their respective 
labor markets. We recently reviewed the Canadian program, while the 
German and Belgian programs were the subject of comparative analysis 
in the early 1990s (Vroman 1992).
Cyclical adjustments in hours worked occur at two margins, the 
extensive and intensive margins, or as changes in employment and 
changes in hours per employed person. Germany and Belgium have 
extensive safety nets for employed workers that include other measures 
besides STC, which also facilitate adjustments in hours per employee. 
Prominent among these other features are working-time accounts (pres-
ent in both Germany and Belgium), working-time corridors (Germany), 
and career interruption benefi ts (Belgium). Burda and Hunt (2011) and 
Boeri and Bruecker (2011) conclude that working-time accounts, along 
with STC, have played an important part in stabilizing German employ-
ment in 2009–2010. While we focus on STC, readers are reminded that 
other factors can infl uence adjustments on the intensive margin. These 
other factors are part of a broad framework of labor market “fl exicu-
rity” present in many OECD economies (see Chapter 2 in this volume). 
Because fl exicurity provisions are generally not present in the United 
States, we merely note their relevance to the analysis of STC in other 
countries.
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Canada
Canada has supported an STC program since the early 1980s. While 
it has been comparatively small in scale, it operates in all provinces of 
the country and exhibits strong cyclical sensitivity. Interested employ-
ers fi le STC plans with the Employment Insurance (EI) agency, and 
claimants receive partial EI benefi ts under approved plans.7 Claimants 
must be monetarily eligible under the same requirements as regular EI 
claimants. Unlike claimants for regular EI benefi ts, who are subject 
to a two-week waiting period, STC recipients are paid during the fi rst 
week of eligibility. The STC payments received do not reduce future 
EI entitlement if the claimant subsequently becomes fully unemployed 
through a layoff. 
With the onset of the Great Recession, Canada modifi ed STC to 
broaden the scope of the program. Potential benefi t duration was 
increased in early 2009 from 38 to 52 weeks and then to 78 weeks. 
Employer participation was encouraged through advertisements in the 
media and revised program requirements that broadened coverage and 
eased the application process. One change was the temporary waiver of 
a detailed plan to return to full work schedules. During 2009 participa-
tion in STC was the highest in the history of the Canadian program.
Germany
Short-time compensation has been present in Germany since the 
end of the nineteenth century and widely used since the late 1920s. 
During the Great Recession the STC program, termed Kurzarbeit, 
expanded dramatically from 50,000 participants in September 2008 to 
1.46 million in May 2009. Over the same period the number of partici-
pating employers increased from 1,491 to 14,936. The large increase 
in participation refl ects the increased usage of the program by large 
establishments.
The STC program in Germany has a number of key features. Plans 
can be established if there is a “signifi cant loss of work,” the defi nition 
of which was eased in February 2009 to broaden the scope of potential 
STC use. The initiative to establish an STC plan can originate from the 
employer or from worker representatives, and both must agree on the 
details of the plan if workers are unionized. In nonrecessionary periods, 
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STC plans usually last six months, but extensions to 12 months are 
common. During the Great Recession, the maximum duration increased 
to 18 months in January 2009 and to 24 months in June. Maximum 
duration throughout 2010 was 18 months.
After the establishment of an STC plan, payments are administered 
by the employer through the company’s payroll system with reimburse-
ment to the employer from the German administrative agency, Bundes-
anstalt für Arbeit (BA). Employers are required to maintain fringe 
benefi t contributions (for health insurance and retirement) so that 
employer fringe benefi t costs increase for their STC workers.
Utilization of STC during the Great Recession was high, and sev-
eral researchers have credited STC with the maintenance of employ-
ment during 2009 and 2010 (Boeri and Bruecker 2011; Burda and Hunt 
2011; Crimmann, Wießner, and Bellmann 2010). The authors conclude 
that absent STC, the level of unemployment in 2009 would have been 
250,000–400,000 higher in Germany.
Other factors have also contributed to the so-called German employ-
ment miracle of 2009–2010. Working-time accounts were widely used. 
These accounts accumulate balances when workers log overtime and, 
rather than receiving take-home pay immediately, the overtime pay is 
deposited into the accounts. Workers can then withdraw from these 
accounts at a later time when weekly hours are reduced. While these 
accounts have existed for more than 20 years and accumulated sub-
stantial balances, they were reduced by large withdrawals during 2009 
and 2010. Both Boeri and Bruecker (2011) and Burda and Hunt (2011) 
attribute the large employment-stabilizing effects in Germany during 
the Great Recession to the utilization of these accounts. 
The list of other factors operative in Germany also includes deliber-
ate employer decisions to forgo overtime hours in favor of employment-
stabilizing adjustments to total hours. Of some importance are working-
time “corridors,” which employers can use to shorten the weekly hours 
of less senior workers. In sum, several factors contributed to the stabili-
zation of employment and unemployment in the face of large reductions 
in real output in Germany. While STC was important, other factors also 
played a major role in stabilizing employment and unemployment (see 
Chapter 2 in this volume).
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Belgium
Belgium operates an STC program of substantial size. Between 
2007 and 2009 the number of benefi ciaries of chomeurs temporaires 
(temporary unemployment schemes) doubled, restraining the increase 
in open unemployment. The program was expanded during 2009 and 
2010 by increasing potential benefi t duration and expanding the occu-
pational coverage to white-collar workers.
Two other programs in Belgium pay benefi ts to part-time work-
ers. Career interruption benefi ts are paid to those who reduce hours to 
pursue non–labor market activities, such as child rearing. Interruptions 
are temporary and may be either total or partial. Credit time accounts, 
fi rst initiated in 2002, is a much smaller program than the working-time 
accounts in Germany, and participation did not expand much in 2009–
2010. Thus in Belgium, the stabilization of employment and unemploy-
ment was attributable mainly to the program of chomeurs temporaires.
Table 6.2 displays comparative data on STC for the United States, 
Canada, Germany, and Belgium. The table has annual data for the four 
years from 2007 to 2010. For the United States, the data pertain to the 
17 states with STC at the end of 2009. This total includes the four larg-
est states, and the 17 states combined represent about half of the labor 
force and unemployment.8 Note that for Canada and Germany certain 
data have been inferred. Total unemployment for all four countries is 
based on own-country labor force surveys. 
Four aspects of Table 6.2 warrant comments. First, the table rein-
forces the point made in the previous section that the scale of STC in 
the United States is small. Even restricting the data to the 17 states with 
long-standing STC programs, the size in 2009, the year of highest uti-
lization, is only 1.1 percent of regular UI recipients. Second, the strong 
cyclicality of STC utilization in all four economies is evident. The fall-
off in utilization during 2010 relative to 2009 is obvious, with the Ger-
man STC percentage (column [6]) falling to half of the 2009 percent-
age. As stated previously, STC is utilized most intensively in the early 
stages of a recession. If the program is to perform a useful stabilization 
function, it has to be established prior to the recession, not after it has 
begun. Furthermore, in this slow recovery from the recession, reduc-
ing layoffs can make an important contribution to improving the labor 
market. Data collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics through its Job 
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Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) indicate that even now, 
22 months into the recovery, 1.8 million jobs are lost each month due to 
involuntary separations. Greater use of STC could further reduce these 
involuntary separations—resulting in a net increase of jobs—or appar-
ent job growth.
Third, the most obvious feature of Table 6.2 is the much larger scale 
of the STC programs in Germany and Belgium. Column (6) shows 
equivalent benefi ciaries as a percentage of regular UC benefi ciaries: the 




























2007 3,495 1,060 12.0 3.2 0.267 0.303
2008 4,531 1,396 22.6 6.2 0.275 0.445
2009 7,123 2,454 104.0 27.7 0.266 1.127
2010 7,608 1,954 67.7 16.8 0.249 0.862
Canada
2007 1,079 479 2.6 0.7 0.286b 0.152
2008 1,117 486 4.8 1.4 0.286b 0.280
2009 1,516 734 48.3 13.8 0.286b 1.884
2010 1,484 683 30.9 8.9 0.286b 1.296
Germany
2007 3,601 1,080 68.0 36.0 0.528 3.337
2008 3,141 917 102.0 46.0 0.451 4.994
2009 3,227 1,141 1,139.0 372.0 0.326 32.603
2010 2,936 1,027 535.0c 174.0c 0.326c 16.999
Belgium
2007 353 429 115.0 30.1 0.261 6.983
2008 334 404 134.7 32.4 0.240 8.018
2009 380 434 210.9 60.6 0.287 13.951
2010 408 438 173.3 49.8 0.287 11.353
a17 states with STC in 2009.
bRatio assumed by the authors based on fi scal year data from 1991–2009.
cBased on part-year data.
SOURCE: Data developed by the authors from national sources. Data in columns (1)–
(4) are in thousands.
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averages during 2009 and 2010 are about 25 percent in Germany and 12 
percent in Belgium. The corresponding two-year averages in the United 
States and Canada were 1.0 and 1.6 percent. Fourth, note the extent of 
the reductions from full schedules suggested by column (5): the ratio 
of full equivalent STC benefi ciaries to the weekly/monthly numbers 
of STC benefi ciaries. For the United States and Belgium, the propor-
tions consistently fall between 0.25 and 0.30, whereas for Germany 
they show a sharp decrease in 2009–2010. In Germany the reduction in 
weekly schedules was about half in 2007–2008 but about one-third in 
2009–2010. The average number of recipients in STC grew much more 
rapidly than the number of full equivalent STC recipients in 2009–2010. 
A fi nal observation about the information in Table 6.2 is the scale 
of the increase in unemployment in the United States compared to the 
other three countries. Unemployment in 2010 was more than twice its 
level of 2007—7.608 million versus 3.495 million.9 The next largest 
increase was in Canada, roughly 50 percent. The increase in Belgium 
was less than 20 percent, while German unemployment did not increase 
in 2009–2010 despite a sharp falloff in real GDP, especially in 2009. 
These data merely reinforce the widely understood point that German 
workers fared comparatively well during the Great Recession.
OPTIONS FOR INCREASING STC UTILIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES
We believe STC needs to be more widely utilized in the United 
States on both equity and effi ciency grounds. Equity is promoted by 
sharing the burden of adjustment more equally across the workforce, 
and effi ciency is advanced by preventing temporary factors from 
destroying valuable job matches (OECD 2010).
We fi nd two aspects of STC particularly attractive when compared 
to the adjustments in hours worked accomplished through layoffs. First, 
we think STC provides a better pattern of burden sharing among work-
ers. A wider pool is affected under STC but the reduction in income 
among affected persons is smaller than under layoffs. Not only does 
STC reduce the volume of worker dislocation but also the adjustment 
problems of dislocated workers, such as long spells of unemployment, 
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reduced reemployment wage rates, and loss of health insurance and 
other fringe benefi ts. In the language of labor economics, STC shifts 
the locus of changes in hours worked from the extensive margin (lay-
offs) to the intensive margin (hours per worker). Second, training costs 
are reduced because workers remain employed and many return to full-
time schedules at their jobs when sales and production recover to pre-
recession levels.
Based on this judgment, we suggest four specifi c actions to increase 
STC utilization: 
1) Disseminate information about STC and its advantages to 
employers and workers. While dissemination of timely information can 
be accomplished by various means, the following are obvious: advertise 
in the media, especially during the earliest stages of a recession; include 
information in UI tax notices to employers; and provide information 
to employers and workers in mass-layoff situations. The latter can be 
activated by the advance notice requirements of WARN legislation that 
requires employers with 50 or more employees to give notice 60 days 
prior to a planned mass layoff. State labor departments then send rapid 
response teams to the worksite to help plan for the subsequent devel-
opments. Rapid response teams include UI specialists who can inform 
employers and workers about STC and potentially infl uence the type of 
adjustments to be made.
Rhode Island, the state with the largest STC program (relative to 
the state labor market), has experience with avoiding plant closings 
when employers and workers have been informed about the STC pro-
gram. This experience at plant sites has helped save jobs that eventually 
returned to full schedules when company sales rebounded.
2) Because of the uncertainty surrounding employer staffi ng deci-
sions at the early stages of a downturn, STC plans must be compar-
atively easy to implement. At present, the employer must submit the 
STC plan to the UI agency to start the process. An alternative approach 
would be to let the employer initiate the STC plan, commence it imme-
diately and administer payments within their existing payroll system, 
but inform the UI agency at the same time. Partial UI benefi ts can be 
paid by the employer, who is then reimbursed by the agency.10 Under 
this arrangement workers would not need to apply for benefi ts as they 
are automatically enrolled and paid.11 To ensure that plans adhere to 
statutory and administrative guidelines, the UI agency can audit some 
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plans and respond to complaints. This approach would resemble the one 
followed in Germany. The advantage is that it would have a rapid start-
up and, more than likely, higher worker participation than at present 
where take-up is far from universal in STC work units.12
If a state deemed this approach inappropriate, an alternative would 
be to ease the application procedure and expedite the approval of STC 
applications during a recession. The UI agency would acknowledge the 
importance of STC by having internal administrative procedures mak-
ing it of equal importance to timely payments for fully unemployed 
claimants.
3) A salient feature of UI in the United States is experience rating. 
Higher payments to laid-off employees cause future employer UI pay-
roll taxes to increase. Experience rating is imperfect, and on average 
only about 60 percent of benefi t payments are charged to the former 
employers. Situations that escape experience rating include payments 
that follow quits, benefi ts to workers when fi rms cease operations, and 
payments by employers taxed at the maximum tax rate. These pay-
ments are termed noncharged and ineffectively charged benefi ts. They 
are typically fi nanced by a common tax, where all employers pay the 
same tax rate.
The payment of STC benefi ts could be treated as a category of non-
charged benefi ts. In effect, the cost of STC benefi ts would be spread 
to all covered employers rather than assigned to STC employers. This 
procedure would provide an explicit reward for maintaining employ-
ment and reducing the volume of layoffs. In other words, STC employ-
ers would be rewarded for making adjustments at the intensive margin 
rather than the extensive margin. If some STC participants were sub-
sequently severed, the later payments for full unemployment would be 
treated the same as other charged benefi ts.
4) A second aspect of STC benefi t payments could also be treated 
differentially from regular UI benefi ts. When a claimant fi les for regu-
lar benefi ts and is deemed eligible, a benefi t year is established. The 
benefi t year is a 52-week period within which the claimant can collect a 
maximum total amount of UI benefi ts. For most claimants (roughly 80 
percent) this amount (the maximum benefi t amount [MBA]) is limited 
to 26 times their weekly benefi t. Any payments within an established 
benefi t year reduce the available balance from their MBA. When the 
remaining balance reaches zero the claimant is said to have exhausted 
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their claim for that year. Currently STC payments reduce the MBA 
remaining balance in the same way as full weekly benefi ts, just at a 
slower weekly rate that refl ects the reduction from the full work sched-
ule. Someone otherwise eligible for 26 weeks who collects STC for 10 
days would only be eligible for 24 weeks of full UI benefi ts in the same 
benefi t year.
This aspect of eligibility treats STC claimants like fully unem-
ployed claimants even though they have remained employed. To the 
extent that STC-eligible persons are concerned about becoming fully 
unemployed, this treatment of their remaining MBA would inhibit their 
participation in STC. The United States is the only country where draw-
ing STC benefi ts reduces potential benefi ts for full unemployment. In 
effect, we treat the STC participants as unemployed while other STC 
programs treat participants as employed. Worker participation in STC 
would be encouraged if STC payments did not reduce the remaining 
balance in the MBA. 
Administration of this changed treatment would require states to 
separately record STC benefi ts and delay establishing a new benefi t 
year when STC would otherwise be the fi rst payment of a new benefi t 
year. A simple way to accomplish this would be to have the federal 
partner fully fi nance STC benefi t payments. This fi nancial arrangement 
would involve reimbursing state UI agencies directly for STC pay-
ments. Employers in states with STC would avoid associated UI taxes 
altogether (including some socialized charges if STC benefi ts were 
treated as noncharged items).
Throughout its 30-year history in the United States, STC has been a 
small program, even in the states with STC. Implementing the four sug-
gested changes would increase STC utilization, making it available to a 
wider set of workers than at present. In unionized situations there would 
need to be agreement by the union as to the plan’s details.
Senator Jack Reed of Rhode Island has tried to foster increased 
use of STC and introduced STC legislation in 2010 and in 2011 with 
Senators Richard Durbin and Sherrod Brown (S.386.IS—Unemploy-
ment Insurance Solvency Act of 2011). Most provisions of their bill 
were included in the Middle Class Tax Relief and Job Creation Act 
of 2012 (PL12-96). The legislation includes three categories of provi-
sions: 1) temporary federal fi nancing of STC benefi ts, 2) grants to states 
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for STC-related purposes, and 3) increased federal responsibilities for 
promoting STC.
The fi rst provision of the legislation relates to temporary federal 
fi nancing of STC programs. This provision not only rewards states 
that have existing programs, but also encourages other states to adopt 
STC. For states with existing programs, 100 percent of the cost of STC 
benefi ts is paid by the federal partner for three full years. States that 
introduce STC programs will have 50 percent of the cost of benefi ts 
subsidized for three years.
The second provision authorizes $100 million in grants to states for 
STC-related purposes. Grants will be disbursed for two types of activi-
ties: 1) implementing newly enacted STC programs and improving 
administration, and 2) promoting and enrolling employers in STC pro-
grams. The allocation formula for disbursing these grants to the states is 
one-third for the fi rst activity and two-thirds for the second.
The third provision relates to increased federal and state responsibil-
ities for promoting STC. Three new areas of responsibilities are added 
to the authority of the U.S. Department of Labor. First, new model lan-
guage for STC legislation in the states will be prepared, updating legis-
lative language drafted some 25 years ago. Second, technical assistance 
and guidance will be provided to the states in establishing and admin-
istering STC. The third establishes the requirements for reporting STC 
activities, a small extension to the existing reporting requirements.
Compared to the suggestions we have proposed above, the 2012 
legislation includes substantial direct fi nancial support both for STC 
benefi t payments and for STC benefi ts administration. It also provides 
fi nancial rewards for effective outreach to employers, whereas we rely 
more on information dissemination through various channels to reach 
employers and increase utilization. The legislation does not speak to 
the treatment of STC benefi t charges in affecting employer UI tax rates 
or the treatment of the STC usage in reducing the claimant’s remaining 
MBA. To the extent that money talks, the fi nancial carrots of the legisla-
tion could encourage adoptions by states. While we have emphasized 
the role of STC at the start of a recession, it could also provide a useful 
role during the recovery phase of the business cycle. During the recov-
ery phase, however, STC would play a smaller role because the volume 
of layoffs is much lower.
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Notes
 1. The term work sharing as used here means reducing hours for the purpose of pre-
serving overall employment. It does not refer to, say, two people sharing a single 
full-time job with each working part time.
 2. Personal taxes are not considered in this example.
 3. For Connecticut, Iowa, Minnesota, and Rhode Island the fi rst year is either 1991 
or 1992.
 4. The linear trend variable is equal to 1 in 1989 and increases by increments of 1 in 
subsequent years. This variable is needed to control for slowly evolving trends. 
An upward trend could refl ect slowly increasing awareness of STC by employers 
and/or workers. 
 5. With an STC program in place, one can expect fewer layoffs and a reduction in the 
economic costs associated with a job separation. It is also possible that receipt of 
STC acts as a signal to modify behavior and adapt to changed economic circum-
stances; for example, increase the rate of saving.
 6. Duration for regular UI benefi ts and for STC is measured as the ratio of weeks 
compensated to fi rst payments.
 7. The UI program in Canada is called Employment Insurance. Monetary eligibility 
is based on hours of work in the past year. The minimum hours requirement varies 
from 420 to 700 depending upon the provincial unemployment rate. 
 8. The total unemployment of 7.608 million in 2010 was 51 percent of the national 
total of 14.825 million.
 9.  The national numbers for the two periods were 14.815 million versus 7.078 mil-
lion, an increase of 109 percent. 
 10. In unionized situations there would have to be agreement by the union as to the 
plan’s details.
 11.  Certain states in the Southeast, for example, the Carolinas and Georgia, already 
have employer-fi led UI claims.
 12. This aspect of STC is one fi nding of the Berkeley Planning Associates 1997 study 
of STC programs.
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Appendix 6A  
State STC Provisions in 2010
Table 6A.1 displays four key requirements that STC plans must satisfy to 
be approved by the UI agency. The table covers the 17 states where STC plans 
were operative at the end of 2009. As noted in the text, three more states cre-
ated STC programs in 2010 and one in 2011.   












Arizona 52 26a 10 40
Arkansas 52 26 10 40
California 26  b 10
Connecticut 26 26c 20 40
Florida 52 25 10 40
Iowa 104 52 20 50
Kansas 52 26 20 40
Maryland 26 26 10 50
Massachusetts 25 26 10 60
Minnesota 52 52 20 40
Missouri 52 26 20 40
New York 20 20 60
Oregon 52 52 20 40
Rhode Island 52 52 10 50
Texas 52 52 10 40
Vermont 26 26 20 50
Washington 52 52 10 50
aLonger limit if the state-insured unemployment rate exceeds 4.0 percent of covered 
employment.
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Appendix 6B
Regression Analysis of STC 
Utilization in 17 States
Table 6B.1 displays results for 17 state-level regression equations typi-
cally spanning the years 1989–2010. The dependent variable is annual STC 
equivalent weeks claimed measured as a percentage of annual weeks in the 
regular UI program of each state. Each regression equation has three explana-
tory variables: 1) the current year’s state total unemployment rate (TUR), 2) 
the TUR lagged one year, and 3) a linear time trend that starts in 1989. Adja-
cent to each estimated slope coeffi cient is the absolute value of its t-ratio. The 
summary measures on the right-hand side of Table 6B.1 are the adjusted R2s, 
the standard error of estimate, and the Durbin-Watson statistic (DW). The fi nal 
columns display the mean of the dependent variable and the maximum per-
centage. The table also identifi es four states where STC data were not available 
from 1989 due to later start dates for the programs (1991 for Iowa and Rhode 
Island; 1992 for Connecticut and Minnesota).
For most states the fi ts are quite satisfactory, with adjusted R2s of at least 
0.50 for 13 states and standard errors below 0.30 for 15 states. The generally 
small scale of STC is vividly illustrated by the small means in the right-hand 
column of Table 6B.1. Rhode Island is the only state where the mean over the 
full period exceeds 1.0 percent of regular UI claims. Only four other states 
have means that exceed 0.40 (California, Kansas, Missouri, and Vermont). 
The small scale of STC is also illustrated by the maximum annual percent-
ages during the estimation period. While most exceed 1.0 percent, only two 
maxima exceed 2.0 percent, Kansas and Rhode Island at 3.24 and 4.17 percent, 
respectively.
While the summary measures in Table 6B.1 show the small scale of STC, 
the regression results point to a pattern of strong cyclical sensitivity. All 17 slope 
coeffi cients on the current year TUR are positive and their t-ratios all exceed 
2.0, the threshold for statistical signifi cance. The t-ratios in eight states even 
exceed 5.0; the slopes are highly signifi cant. When unemployment increases, 
utilization of STC increases relative to utilization of regular UI claims.
The patterns for the lagged TUR coeffi cients are nearly as consistent. All 
17 are negative and 13 have t-ratios of 2.0 or larger. In the year after the TUR 
increases there is a sharp falloff in STC usage. Short-time compensation usage 
decreases noticeably in the second year of a recessionary period. This falloff 
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occurs even if the TUR is higher in the second year of a recession as in 2010 
relative to 2009. For 16 of 17 states the percentage was higher in 2009 than in 
2010. Finally, the underlying data also illustrate the severe nature of the recent 
recession. The highest usage of STC over the full period occurred in 2009 for 
14 of 17 states. 
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Table 6B.1  Regressions Explaining STC Equivalent Weeks as a Percentage of Regular Weeks, 1989–2010





Arizona 0.289 (2.3) 0.064 (2.6) −0.051 (1.7) −0.0062 (1.4) 0.161 0.121 2.62 0.297 0.629
Arkansas −0.149 (1.3) 0.102 (3.6) −0.072 (2.3) 0.0020 (0.6) 0.441 0.074 1.33 0.048 0.407
California −0.185 (2.3)   0.162 (10.8) −0.085 (4.8) 0.0021 (0.7) 0.890 0.083 1.82 0.414 1.053
Connecticut 1992 −0.172 (0.6) 0.232 (3.3) −0.170 (2.1) 0.0106 (0.8) 0.495 0.258 2.04 0.308 1.622
Florida 0.036 (1.1) 0.031 (4.8) −0.020 (2.5) −0.0027 (2.2) 0.584 0.033 1.50 0.073 0.183
Iowa 1991 −0.397 (1.8) 0.339 (3.5) −0.224 (2.1) 0.0023 (0.3) 0.523 0.168 2.15 0.110 1.006
Kansas 0.648 (0.8) 0.501 (2.4) −0.610 (2.7) 0.0459 (2.0) 0.377 0.598 1.86 0.723 3.237
Maryland −0.116 (3.2) 0.063 (7.6) −0.026 (2.6) −0.0019 (1.9) 0.783 0.030 1.96 0.048 0.213
Massachusetts −0.209 (2.6) 0.107 (6.0) −0.076 (4.1) 0.0132 (4.2) 0.714 0.094 1.96 0.132 0.765
Minnesota 1992 −0.216 (2.4) 0.175 (5.3) −0.120 (3.6) 0.0094 (1.9) 0.770 0.098 1.50 0.166 0.790
Missouri 0.003 (0.0) 0.162 (5.5) −0.138 (4.0) 0.0275 (6.7) 0.858 0.111 2.01 0.476 1.354
New York −0.436 (2.6) 0.172 (5.6) −0.101 (3.1) 0.0201 (4.4) 0.698 0.135 1.84 0.257 1.141
Oregon −0.524 (4.6) 0.135 (6.5) −0.050 (2.1) 0.0103 (2.4) 0.803 0.110 1.31 0.163 1.010
Rhode Island 1991 −1.410 (3.0) 0.302 (2.9) −0.109 (0.9) 0.1021 (5.2) 0.773 0.456 1.67 1.122 4.173
Texas −0.581 (1.7) 0.178 (3.1) −0.119 (1.8) 0.0496 (6.4) 0.776 0.192 0.92 0.345 1.501
Vermont 0.090 (0.4) 0.208 (3.6) −0.227 (4.0) 0.0462 (6.6) 0.744 0.208 1.75 0.540 1.511
Washington −1.128 (4.9) 0.227 (5.7) −0.053 (1.1) 0.0259 (3.9) 0.781 0.188 0.64 0.256 1.562
SOURCE: Regressions based on data from U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and OUI. Absolute values of t-ratios 
adjacent to coeffi cients.
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